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The relationships between spatial attention and conscious perception are currently the
object of intense debate. Recent evidence of double dissociations between attention
and consciousness cast doubt on the time-honored concept of attention as a gateway
to consciousness. Here we review evidence from behavioral, neurophysiologic, neuropsy-
chological, and neuroimaging experiments, showing that distinct sorts of spatial attention
can have different effects on visual conscious perception. While endogenous, or top-
down attention, has weak inﬂuence on subsequent conscious perception of near-threshold
stimuli, exogenous, or bottom-up forms of spatial attention appear instead to be a neces-
sary, although not sufﬁcient, step in the development of reportable visual experiences.
Fronto-parietal networks important for spatial attention, with peculiar inter-hemispheric dif-
ferences, constitute plausible neural substrates for the interactions between exogenous
spatial attention and conscious perception.
Keywords: attention, conscious perception, endogenous, exogenous, fronto-parietal networks, neglect
BACKGROUND
Both “attention” and “consciousness” refer to complex concepts in
search of consensus for deﬁnition. “Consciousness” can indicate a
state of vigilance or wakefulness, which ranges between comatose
states to being awake. It can also refer to the conscious process-
ing of a given piece of information, such as being conscious of a
person that just entered the room. In this review we will focus on
the later meaning. Contrary to what introspection suggests, only
a small fraction of all the information reaching our senses can be
the object of verbal report or voluntary action. Although verbal
reportability is one of the main measures of conscious perception,
there are many situations in which we can be conscious of some
information that we cannot report, essentially because it vanishes
from consciousness very quickly. In this paper,wewill review stud-
ies that have used verbal reports of perceptual objects as a measure
of consciousness. On the other hand, attentional processes refer
to a heterogeneous set of functions, subserved by partially distinct
neurocognitive systems. We will refer to attention as a mechanism
for the selection of information, in its different varieties of orient-
ing, alerting, and executive control (Posner and Cohen, 1984). We
will particularly focus on the relationship between distinct forms
of spatial attention and conscious perception.
Historically, attention and consciousness have been intrinsi-
cally linked. Introspection suggests that when we attend to an
object or part of a scene we become conscious of it. Removing
attention away from the object makes it fade from consciousness.
Although there seems to be a consensus on the fact that some
level of general alertness is needed in order to consciously perceive
(Robertson et al., 1998;Dehaene andChangeux,2011;Kusnir et al.,
2011), the relationship between spatial attention and conscious
perception has proven intriguing and difﬁcult to explore empiri-
cally. James (1890) originally provided an inﬂuential deﬁnition of
the interplay between attention and conscious perception:“(atten-
tion) is the taking possession of the mind, in clear and vivid form,
of one out of several simultaneously possible objects or trains
of thought.” This view led many to posit that spatial attention
and conscious perception are inextricably related (Posner, 1994;
O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Chun and Marois, 2002; Bartolomeo,
2008). Although most of the models do not propose that the
mechanism of attention is the mechanism of consciousness itself
(Posner, 1994), they implicate that consciousness emerges from
the processing of attentional systems that ﬁlter out information
from our crowded environment. Attentional selection is therefore
considered a necessary, although maybe not sufﬁcient, condition
for consciousness. Others directly equate attentional capture and
consciousness. Simons (2000) for example, distinguished between
implicit and explicit attentional capture. Implicit attentional cap-
ture refers to stimuli that can speed up performance or affect eye
movements without being consciously detected (Theeuwes, 1994;
Theeuwes et al., 1998). Explicit attentional capture refers to stimuli
that affect performance and are consciously detected. According
to Simons (2000), implicit effects on behavior might not embody
all aspects of attentional capture, while explicit attentional capture
is equated to consciousness, i.e., it is assumed that if participants
consciously reported the stimuli is because they captured spatial
attention.
Some lines of evidence support the existence of a tight rela-
tionship between spatial attention and consciousness. The most
classical example of interaction between the two processes is
observed in the inattentional blindness paradigm, where salient
changes in the features of visual stimuli are missed when unat-
tended (Mack and Rock, 1998), even when stimuli are presented
at the fovea. Moreover, such phenomenon is enhanced when
the deployment of attention is challenged by increased levels of
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perceptual load (Lavie, 2006). It has been postulated that inat-
tentional blindness is not produced by a lack of attention but
by a lack of expectation (Braun, 2001; Mack, 2001), although
expectation can be considered as a form of top-down attention
(Asplund et al., 2010). One of the most striking examples of the
inﬂuence of attention in consciousness has been demonstrated
by the selective looking task (Neisser and Becklen, 1975). In one
of the versions of this paradigm, participants were attentionally
engaged in counting the passes made by two basketball teams.
After some time, a man wearing a gorilla costume walked across
the display. Surprisingly, 35% of the participants did not see the
gorilla, which was instead detected 100% of the times when atten-
tion was not engaged in counting the passes (Simons and Chabris,
1999). These and other experiments have provided deﬁnitive evi-
dence that important changes in our visual world can be missed
when unattended.
Strong evidence supporting the existence of a link between spa-
tial attention and conscious perception also comes from right
brain-damaged patients affected by left spatial neglect. These
patients suffer from damage to the right parietal lobe, or to its
connections with the ipsilateral prefrontal cortex (PFC; Thiebaut
de Schotten et al., 2005; Bartolomeo et al., 2007). Patients with
left brain damage may also show signs of contralesional, right-
sided neglect, albeit more rarely, and usually in a less severe form
(Bartolomeo et al., 2001a; Beis et al., 2004). Although patients’
visual capabilities can be intact, severe problems in attentional
orienting are observed. Patients frequently miss contralesionally
presented stimuli, especially when there is competing information
in the ipsilesional visual ﬁeld. In other words, neglect patients’
acquired inability to orient attention toward the contralesional
left hemiﬁeld makes them unaware of stimuli presented within
the neglected space (Bartolomeo, 2007). This suggests a strong
link between the brain circuits underlying spatial orienting and
the putative neural correlates of conscious perception (Figure 1).
DISSOCIATIONS BETWEEN SPATIAL ATTENTION AND
CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION
Challenging the classical view of attention as a gateway to con-
sciousness, some studies have reporteddissociations between some
forms of spatial attention and conscious perception. Some of
these dissociations have been described in the blindsight patient
GY (Kentridge et al., 1999, 2004; Schurger et al., 2006). Blind-
sight can be observed after lesions in the primary visual cortex of
one or both hemispheres (Weiskrantz, 1986). Although patients
report to be blind in the contralesional visual ﬁeld, and there-
fore not conscious of visual stimulation, they can perform above
chance in some tasks such as guessing the orientation of movement
(Weiskrantz, 1986). They can also navigate avoiding obstacles in
a room, while denying to see them (de Gelder et al., 2008). The
study of these patients is especially interesting in research on con-
sciousness, because their accuracy in detecting or discriminating
information in the blind hemiﬁeld can sometimes be comparable
to stimuli reported as being consciously perceived. To study the
relationship between spatial attention and conscious perception,
Kentridge and colleagues (Kentridge et al., 1999; see also Ken-
tridge et al., 2004) presented the blindsight patient GY with targets
in the blind hemiﬁeld preceded by endogenous cues in the fovea
or exogenous peripheral cues in the blind hemiﬁeld. Both cues
speeded up responses to targets, even though the patient denied
seeing targets as well as peripheral cues. This result demonstrates
that after damage to the primary visual cortex, attention can be
deployed, and speed up responses, in the absence of conscious-
ness for cues or targets. Thus, GY can pay attention to visual
information unavailable to verbal report.
Analogous dissociations between spatial attention and con-
sciousness have been reported in normal observers. In a Posner-
type paradigm, where attention was oriented by using spa-
tially predictive central cues (arrows), non-consciously perceived
primes (which were masked by subsequent targets) presented at
FIGURE 1 | (A) Right-hemisphere networks of visuospatial attention
according to Corbetta and Shulman (2002); (B)The three branches of the
Superior Longitudinal Fasciculus according to Thiebaut de Schotten et al.
(2011); (C) Brain regions associated to visual neglect in different studies
(modiﬁed fromThiebaut de Schotten et al., 2011). The ﬁgure represents the
anatomical brain regions associated to spatial attention, the white matter
branches that might connect them, and the anatomical overlap of lesions
causing neglect after damage to spatial attentional networks.
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attentionally cued locations, sped up responses when they were
color-congruent rather than incongruent with the target (Ken-
tridge et al., 2008). Importantly, in this case attention did not allow
participants to consciously report the primes, showing once more
that spatial attention can be deployed in the absence of conscious
perception of the attended information.
Koch and Tsuchiya (2007) have also recently reviewed some
situations in which endogenous or top-down attention can be dis-
sociated from conscious perception. For example, there are some
situations in which participants attend without being conscious
of the attended information. In visual crowding, for example, the
orientation of a grating can be made unconscious, but it still
produces an aftereffect that is supposed to require focal atten-
tion (He et al., 1996). It has also been demonstrated that priming
for invisible (masked) words is only observed if participants are
attending to the moment in time where the prime–target pair will
occur. However, in this case, attended words do not reach con-
sciousness (Naccache et al., 2002). Feature-based attention can
also spread to invisible stimuli (Melcher et al., 2005; Kanai et al.,
2006), once again demonstrating that some forms of attention
deploy without subsequent conscious perception of the attended
information.
There seem to be other situations in which consciousness hap-
pens in the near absence of attention. For example, the gist of
a visual scene is immune to inattentional blindness (Mack and
Rock, 1998), and can be discriminated in 30ms, too short a time
to develop top-down attention. This observationwas alreadymade
by Posner (1994), who remarked that attention seemed to be
needed for focal awareness, but not for awareness of the back-
ground (Iwasaki, 1993). With attention focused to the center of
the display in a dual task, participants can determine if the scene
contains an animal or a vehicle, but cannot perform a simpler task,
such as distinguishing a colored disk (Li et al., 2002). Following
the feature binding model (Treisman and Gelade, 1980), spatial
attention is considered to be important for feature integration but
not for single feature extraction. It is possible that when stimuli
are complex, feature integration is not necessary, because the pro-
cessing of multiple single features can be enough to discriminate
the object.
It is crucial to note that all these previous studies reviewed by
Koch and Tsuchiya (2007) investigated the relationship between
endogenous (or top-down) forms of spatial attention and con-
scious perception. By using magneto-encephalography, it has also
been recently reported that endogenous spatial attention, oriented
using central arrow cues, can be electrophysiologically dissociated
from conscious perception in visual areas of the occipital cortex
(Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008). Whether they were attended
or not, consciously perceived stimuli modulated mid-frequency
gamma-band activity over the contralateral visual cortex, whereas
spatial attention modulated high-frequency gamma-band activ-
ity, independent of whether targets were consciously perceived or
not. This constitutes a neural dissociation of attention and con-
scious perception, at least in visual areas of the cortex (although
see Chica et al., submitted; described below). Finally, opposite
effects of endogenous attention and consciousness have been
observed on afterimages (van Boxtel et al., 2010). While manip-
ulating attention via a demanding central task, stimulus visibility
was simultaneously manipulated using a perceptual suppression
procedure. van Boxtel and colleagues demonstrated that attention
and consciousness produced opposite effects on afterimages: while
attention decreased their duration, consciousness enhanced it.
Altogether, the results from these studies suggest that top-down
ampliﬁcation or endogenous attention is neither necessary nor
sufﬁcient for consciousness.
EXOGENOUS SPATIAL ATTENTION INTERACTIONS WITH
CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION
It is now well established that the orienting system of the human
brain is not unitary. Spatial attention can be oriented either
endogenously (i.e., top-down, guided by task demands, or by
goals of the task at hand) or exogenously (i.e., bottom-up, dri-
ven by the saliency of stimulation, such as in attentional capture).
These attentional systems are implemented in partially different
brain regions (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Chica et al., 2011a),
and produce differential effects on information processing (Klein,
2004; Chica et al., 2006). Important components of these networks
include the dorsolateral PFC and the posterior parietal cortex
(PPC). Physiological studies indicate that these two structures
show interdependence of neural activity (Buschman and Miller,
2007). In the monkey, analogous PPC and PFC areas show coordi-
nated activitywhen the animal selects a visual stimulus as a saccade
target. Importantly, PFC and PPC show distinctive dynamics of
interaction when attention is selected by the stimulus (bottom-up
or exogenous orienting) or when it is directed by more top-down
(or endogenous) goals. Bottom-up signals appear ﬁrst in the pari-
etal cortex and are characterized by an increase of fronto-parietal
coherence in the gamma-band, whereas top-down signals emerge
ﬁrst in the frontal cortex and tend to synchronize in the beta
band (Buschman and Miller, 2007). Within the right parietal cor-
tex, regions such as the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) seem related
to both endogenous and exogenous spatial attention, while the
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) is exclusively implicated in exoge-
nous spatial attention (Chica et al., 2011a; see also Friedrich et al.,
1998). Therefore, the ﬁnding that endogenous attention and con-
scious perception dissociate does not necessarily imply the same
conclusion for exogenous attention.
Previous research on patients with right brain damage and
left visual neglect (characterized by unawareness for left-sided
objects) has consistently demonstrated that consciousness deﬁcits
in neglect are systematically associated to impairments of exoge-
nous spatial orienting; endogenous orienting, on the other hand,
can be relatively spared, if slowed, in these patients (Bartolomeo
and Chokron, 2002). Deﬁcits in exogenous orienting in neglect
patients typically take the form of an immediate rightward ori-
enting of attention as soon as the visual scene unfolds (Gainotti
et al., 1991; D’Erme et al., 1992), followed by the so called “dis-
engagement deﬁcit” (Posner et al., 1984; Friedrich et al., 1998;
Losier and Klein, 2001).When presented with a right-sided, ipsile-
sional peripheral cue followed by a left-sided, contralesional target,
neglect patients respond extremely slow, and may miss the tar-
get altogether. This result is usually interpreted as an impairment
of the disengagement of attention from ipsilesional stimuli. The
deﬁcit is enhanced by the presence of bilateral placeholder mark-
ers in the display (Gainotti et al., 1991; D’Erme et al., 1992;
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Rastelli et al.,2008),whichpresumably increase attentional capture
from ipsilesional, right-sided objects (Bartolomeo et al., 2004).
Interestingly, when peripheral cues are made spatially predictive
of the future location of the target, the disengagement deﬁcit
ameliorates (Bartolomeo and Chokron, 2002). For example, if
the ipsilesional cue (presented on the right hemiﬁeld) predicts
with high probability target appearance on the contralesional
(left) hemiﬁeld (which is known as counterpredictive cues), par-
ticipants’ responses are faster and less targets are missed than if
the peripheral cue is not spatially predictive (Bartolomeo et al.,
2001b; Figure 2). This indicates that brain lesions associated to
neglect and causing severe deﬁcits in consciously detecting con-
tralesionally presented information (Thiebaut de Schotten et al.,
2005; Bartolomeo et al., 2007),mostly affect exogenous rather than
endogenous spatial attention.
This clinical observation made us hypothesize that although
endogenous spatial attention can be dissociated from conscious
perception (Kentridge et al., 1999; Lamme, 2003; Koch and
Tsuchiya, 2007;Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008), exogenous atten-
tion might instead be an important antecedent of our conscious
experience. To test for this hypothesis, we presented normal par-
ticipants with near-threshold stimuli, preceded either by central
symbolic cues or by peripheral cues (Chica et al., 2011b). In order
to avoid the involuntary orienting produced by some central cues,
such as arrows (Ristic et al., 2002), we used purely symbolic cues
(letters or colors) indicating the more likely location of target
appearance. Target contrast was manipulated so that participants
could only perceive a proportion of the targets. If attentional ori-
enting increased target conscious perception, more targets should
be reported at the attended than at the unattended location. Con-
sistentwithpreviousﬁndings (Kentridge et al.,1999;Lamme,2003;
Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008) when
spatial attention was endogenously oriented using central sym-
bolic cues, weak, or null modulations of conscious reports were
observed (Chica et al., 2011b)1. However, exogenous orienting
triggered by peripheral cues produced strong and consistent mod-
ulations of conscious reports, and was able to increase conscious
detection rates at the attended vs. the unattended location (Chica
et al., 2011b).
Using electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings, we have also
demonstrated that the attentional capture produced by the periph-
eral cue correlates with subsequent conscious reports of near-
threshold targets (Chica et al., 2010, in press). We used non-
predictive peripheral cues, which capture spatial attention exoge-
nously, and observed that a cue-related event-related potential
(ERP), the P100 component, was strictly linked to subsequent
conscious reports (Chica et al., 2010). Importantly, the cue-related
P100 was larger for subsequently seen targets than for unseen tar-
gets when attentional cues were valid; in contrast, P100 was larger
for subsequently unseen than for seen targets when attentional
cues were invalid (Figure 3). The P100 component elicited by
the cue might well index the capture of attention that the cue
produced. Thus, if valid cues captured attention to the location
of the impending target, then more targets would be consciously
1Other studies have reported signiﬁcant modulations on the proportion of con-
sciously reported targets when spatial attention was endogenously oriented using
central cues (Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008; Hsu et al., 2011). However, in these
studies,SignalDetectionTheory (Green andSwets,1966) parameters such as percep-
tual sensitivity (d′) and response criterion (beta) could not be separately calculated
for attended and unattended targets (see Chica et al., 2011b, where these analyses
were performed). The fact that more false alarms (conscious reports of target pres-
ence when no target was actually presented) were committed when central cues were
spatially predictive (12% in Hsu et al., 2011, Experiment 1) than when they were
not (6% in Hsu et al., 2011, Experiment 1), together with the ﬁnding of signiﬁcant
differences in the general d′ between spatially predictive and non-predictive cues,
and close to signiﬁcance differences in response criterion [t (13)= 1.64, p = 0.11],
strongly suggests that participants may have adopted a stricter response criterion to
report targets at the unattended vs. the attended location, especially when central
cues were spatially predictive of target appearance (Hsu et al., 2011).
FIGURE 2 | Mean neglect patients’ reaction times to detect a
peripheral target preceded by (A) a spatially non-predictive
peripheral cue or (B) a counterpredictive peripheral cue, i.e., a cue
indicating target appearance at the opposite location (data from
Bartolomeo et al., 2001b).The disengagement deﬁcit is observed for
left-targets presented at invalid vs. valid locations at the short (50ms)
SOA for non-predictive cues. When cues are counterpredictive, the
disengagement deﬁcit decreases (see results for left-sided targets,
50ms SOA), and neglect patients can take into account the information
provided by the cue, responding faster at the attended (invalid) location
than at the unattended (valid) location at the longest (1000ms) SOA for
left-presented targets.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Graphical illustration of a paradigm used to manipulate spatial
attention and conscious perception (Chica et al., 2010, 2011b, in press,
submitted). (B)Topographic distribution of the P100 effect, 120ms after cue
appearance; and event-related cue-locked potential waveforms for valid and
invalid cues, leading to seen and unseen reports (adapted from Chica et al.,
2010). The ﬁgure shows that for valid cues, P100 is larger for subsequently
seen than unseen targets; for invalid cues, P100 is instead larger for
subsequently unseen than seen targets.
perceived at that location. However, if an invalid cue captured
attention to a wrong location, fewer targets would be consciously
perceived. Correlations between the attentional capture produced
by the cue and subsequent conscious reports were observed even
when cue-related responses were considered on a trial-by-trial
basis. Using a paradigm in which endogenous and exogenous ori-
enting are manipulated during the same trial, it has also been
demonstrated, within the same experimental design, that while
exogenous attentional capture interactswith the conscious percep-
tion of near-threshold targets, endogenous orienting can be disso-
ciated from conscious reports (Chica et al., in press). This clearly
demonstrates that exogenous attention is an important modulator
of conscious perception (see also Koivisto et al., 2009), and that
the state of the attentional system before the target is presented
modulates our conscious experience (see also Super et al., 2003;
Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2004; Dehaene and Changeux, 2005).
Although some of the studies reviewed in the previous section
have demonstrated that endogenous spatial attention can be dis-
sociated from conscious perception, this has not always been the
case. The seminal studies suggesting an interdependence between
spatial attention and consciousness, such as inattentional blind-
ness (Mack and Rock, 1998) or the selective looking task (Neisser
and Becklen, 1975), manipulated endogenous spatial attention
and measured conscious reports. Research on visual search has
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also demonstrated that at least under certain conditions, salient
distractorsmight not capture attention if they do not share any rel-
evant feature with the target (Folk et al., 1992). For example, when
searching for a red letter,only red distractorswill capture attention,
while other colored distractors will not. This is known as “contin-
gent attentional capture,” a phenomenon that demonstrates how
top-down or endogenous expectancies interact with the exoge-
nous attentional capture produced by the stimuli themselves. It
is possible that while endogenous attention does not determine
our conscious experience when there is no competing stimulation
(Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008; Chica et al., 2011b, in press), it
does play a role when information has to be selected from crowded
environments (such as in the inattentional blindness paradigm or
selective looking task; see Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010; Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011), or when endogenous expectancies inter-
act with exogenous attentional capture (such as in “contingent
attentional capture” paradigms). This proposal is coherent with
models postulating that conscious and non-conscious perception
depend on perceptual load; information can be selected out by
attention under high levels of perceptual load, while more infor-
mation can be consciously processed under low levels of percep-
tual load (Lavie, 2006; Macdonald and Lavie, 2008). Endogenous
attention might thus modulate consciousness only when its func-
tioning is required by high levels of perceptual load in crowded
environments.
EXOGENOUS SPATIAL ATTENTION IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR
CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION
In the previous section we have reviewed evidence indicating
that exogenous spatial attention is an important antecedent of
our conscious experience. However, there are also many observa-
tions demonstrating that exogenous attentional capture does not
always lead to conscious perception. As stated above, exogenous
peripheral cues presented in the blind hemiﬁeld of the blind-
sight patient GY, sped up responses to the target, in the absence
of conscious perception of the cues or targets (Kentridge et al.,
1999, 2008). Similarly, in healthy participants, subliminal periph-
eral cues have been observed to speed up responses to targets
presented at the same spatial location, demonstrating attentional
deployment in the absence of consciousness of the visually pre-
sented cue (McCormick, 1997; Lambert et al., 1999). Further
evidence have demonstrated attentional capture or pre-attentitive
orienting to unresolvable Gabor patches embedded among sim-
ple luminance patches, while participants could not consciously
distinguish between the two (Rajimehr, 2004). This is in line
with evidence of attentional capture without consciousness of the
feature that captured spatial attention.
Other studies have shown that exogenous spatial attention
modulates the processing of masked stimuli that are not con-
sciously perceived (Lachter et al., 2004; Marzouki et al., 2007).
In some cases, exogenous peripheral cues are sufﬁcient to generate
priming when the primes and targets occupy different spatial loca-
tions. This result indicates that exogenous peripheral cues produce
effects at early stages of visual processing (Finkbeiner and Forster,
2008), boosting the signals from primary visual areas. However,
the presence of the mask disrupts further processing, avoiding
conscious perception of the targets.
Woodman and Luck (2003) used an “object substitution mask-
ing”paradigm to explore the role of attention in conscious percep-
tion. In this paradigm, an object presented in a crowded environ-
ment ismaskedby the presentationof small objects surrounding it;
when themask offsets sometime after the display onset, themasked
object is not consciously perceived. InWoodman and Luck’s study,
the N2pc ERP component (a N200 observed at parietal sites,
reﬂecting attentional capture) was used to index the orienting of
attention to the target. Their results showed that the N2pc was
elicited both when the target was consciously perceived and when
it was not, leading the authors to conclude that attention and
conscious perception are two independent processes, and that ori-
enting of attention did not intrinsically produce conscious reports.
However, as noted by the authors, the N2pc ended earlier when
targets were not consciously perceived. If N2pc is a correlate of
exogenous orienting of attention, these results can be interpreted
as supporting the idea that exogenous attention is an important
modulator of conscious perception. The fact the N2pc ended ear-
lierwhen the stimuluswas not consciously reportedmight indicate
that even if the target produced an exogenous attentional capture,
the corresponding fronto-parietal activation was unable to main-
tain the exogenous capture of attention long enough to trigger
the necessary reverberation of information required for conscious
processing (see below).
There is also accumulating evidence demonstrating that dis-
tractors can capture exogenous attention in visual search tasks
and affect performance and eye movements, while participants are
completely unconscious of the presence of these distractors and
their inﬂuence on their behavior (Theeuwes, 1994; Theeuwes et al.,
1998). In oculomotor capture paradigms, attentional capture is
reﬂected by inappropriate eyemovements to irrelevant distractors.
Importantly, participants are not conscious of the eye movements
elicited by distractors during search. All these results clearly indi-
cate that attentional capture does not always lead to the conscious
perception of the attended information.
NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION
The studies reviewed in the two previous sections indicate that at
least some forms of attention, such as exogenous spatial attention,
might be necessary, although by no means sufﬁcient, for conscious
perception. Some models have proposed other processes as neces-
sary for consciousness, such as recurrent processingof information
within functionally interconnected brain regions (Dehaene and
Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al., 2006; Lamme, 2006; Fahrenfort
et al., 2007). During information processing, two neural processes
have been distinguished: a feedforward sweep (earlier activation of
cells in successive areas of the visual hierarchy) followed by recur-
rent processing (recurrent interactions between neurons within
an area and other neurons that activated earlier at lower levels).
According to a recent model (Lamme, 2003), conscious percep-
tion needs recurrent processing. This is an interesting approach
because it does not point to any isolated brain region as the
neural correlate of conscious perception; instead, the reverbera-
tion of information within functionally connected brain regions
is deemed important. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
studies have stressed the importance of recurrent processing. For
example, TMS-mediated V1 disruption prevents consciousness at
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a timepoint far from the feedforward sweep of information (Walsh
and Cowey, 1998). Moreover, TMS in visual area V5 (MT) pro-
duces motion sensation, unless V1 is stimulated at a later moment
in time (Pascual-Leone and Walsh, 2001), which also indicates the
importance of early visual areas in later stages of processing that
are crucial for recurrent processing.
So far, for the quest for the neural correlate of consciousness
have led to controversial results (seeRees et al., 2002a;Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011; for reviews). When contrasting consciously seen
vs. unseen stimuli, some authors have proposed that conscious-
ness is related to activity in the thalamus and brain stem (Paus,
2000), in visual areas along the ventral cortical visual stream (Bar
and Biederman, 1999; Grill-Spector et al., 2000; Moutoussis and
Zeki, 2002; Pins and ffytche, 2003; Ress and Heeger, 2003; Zeki,
2003; Tse et al., 2005), or in parietal and prefrontal regions (Crick
and Koch, 1995; Beck et al., 2001; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Rees et al., 2002a; Dehaene et al., 2003; Dehaene and Changeux,
2005; Marois and Ivanoff, 2005; Chica et al., submitted).
When using masking procedures, activity in V1 is related to
conscious reports, and drawing attention away from the stimulus
does not produce activity in fronto-parietal areas, but in visual
areas (Tse et al., 2005). Additionally, lesions in cortical visual areas
destroy conscious perception (as in cortical blindness, homony-
mous hemianopia, or cerebral achromatopsia),which also indicate
that conscious perception needs the activity of early visual regions.
Based on these sort of data, some models propose that visual con-
sciousness resides in each particular area in charge of processing
the relevant feature (Zeki, 2003). According to these proposals,
consciousness of a color resides in V4, a region of the visual cor-
tex putatively involved in color processing. However, early visual
activation is not always sufﬁcient for consciousness. For example,
activity in early visual areas can be observed even when partici-
pants deny seeing the stimuli (Dehaene et al., 2001; Vuilleumier
et al., 2001; Moutoussis and Zeki, 2002; Marois et al., 2004; Ser-
gent et al., 2005). Primary visual cortex can also be selectively
activated in response to perceptually indiscriminable orientation
information, indicating that V1 is not sufﬁcient for generating
conscious reports (Rajimehr, 2004). The existence of high-order
processing of orientation in the absence of consciousness has also
been reported, demonstrating interactions between V1 and V4,
and V1 and V5 (Rajimehr, 2004). Moreover, when invisibility is
caused by masking (Dehaene et al., 2001) or dichoptic stimula-
tion (Moutoussis and Zeki, 2002), activity in early visual areas is
weak, which can invite the conclusion that consciousness needs
a stronger activation of these regions. However, when invisibility
is caused by neglect or inattention, activity in early visual areas
can be strong (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Marois et al., 2004; Sergent
et al., 2005). In the case of spatial neglect, visual areas are often
intact, but patients can act as if they were completely blind for the
information presented in the contralesional hemi-space.
Other studies have related the emergence of conscious states to
the activity in parieto-frontal structures (Crick and Koch, 1995;
Beck et al., 2001; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Rees et al., 2002a;
Dehaene et al., 2003; Dehaene and Changeux, 2005; Marois and
Ivanoff, 2005; Chica et al., submitted). These sets of data have
been used to substantiate “high-order” theories of conscious-
ness (see Lau and Rosenthal, 2011; for a recent review), which
postulate that consciousness depends on neural activity in pre-
frontal and parietal regions, although consciousness might not
add a signiﬁcant utility or immediate impact on behavioral and
task performance. Other models (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Dehaene et al., 2006) also propose the importance of prefrontal
and parietal areas for consciousness, and underline the strong links
of conscious processing to the ﬂexible control of behavior, cogni-
tive control, and the ability to perform various tasks. Dehaene
and his colleagues have proposed a model in which both bottom-
up stimulus strength and top-down attentional ampliﬁcation are
jointly needed for conscious perception; however, these features
might not always be sufﬁcient for a stimulus to cross the thresh-
old for conscious perception. They propose the existence of two
types of non-conscious processes: subliminal and pre-conscious.
According to the authors, subliminal processing (i.e., information
that does not reach consciousness but can affect our behavior) is
the consequence of bottom-up activation of lower sensory areas
that is insufﬁcient to trigger a large-scale reverberating process to
create the conditions for conscious perception. In contrast, pre-
conscious processing refers to neural processes that can potentially
access consciousness (i.e., they carry enough activation), but those
are temporally inaccessible due to the lack of top-down attentional
ampliﬁcation.
Both Lamme’s (2003) model and Dehaene and colleagues’
model (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al., 2006) can
be helpful to understand the controversial set of data found when
consciously seen and unseen reports have been compared using
different paradigms. Masked stimuli produce feedfoward activa-
tion in V1, the inferior temporal cortex, frontal eye ﬁelds, and
the motor cortex. However, neurophysiological manifestations
of recurrent interaction are suppressed by backward masking
(Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme et al., 2002), which pre-
vents the stimulus to reach consciousness. When masked stimuli
are unattended, only occipito-temporal activation is recorded (Tse
et al., 2005). When they are attended, however, activity is observed
in both early visual areas and fronto-parietal regions (Dehaene
et al., 2001; Haynes et al., 2005). Nevertheless, attention is not suf-
ﬁcient for a masked stimulus to reach consciousness, because the
mask prevents recurrent processing from fronto-parietal regions
to visual areas (see below). Similarly, blindsight patients can
process (and respond to) unreported visual information, but due
to their lesions of the visual cortex, recurrent processing from
fronto-parietal regions to visual areas is altered, thus preventing
consciousness to occur.
Near-threshold stimuli also differ in the activity they evoke in
early visual areas and fronto-parietal regions (Pins and ffytche,
2003; Ress and Heeger, 2003; Palva et al., 2005). Their perception
depends on several factors, such as recurrent processing, alertness
(Kusnir et al., 2011), the amount of spontaneous activity before
stimulus presentation (Super et al., 2003; Linkenkaer-Hansen et al.,
2004; Dehaene and Changeux, 2005), and exogenous attentional
capture to their spatial location (Chica et al., 2010, 2011b, in
press, submitted). Using supra-threshold targets, previous work
has consistently demonstrated that exogenous (as well as endoge-
nous) attention increases contrast appearance (see, e.g., Pestilli
and Carrasco, 2005; Carrasco, 2006). It could then be argued that
exogenous attention increases conscious reports of near-threshold
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targets by a similar perceptual mechanism as that increasing target
contrast at the exogenously attended location. This would imply
that, contrary to our proposal, exogenous attention might not be
necessary for conscious perception; it might only enhance such
conscious perceiving. This interpretation is consistent with mod-
els proposing an important role of early visual and/or occipito-
temporal areas in conscious perception (Super et al., 2001; Lamme
et al., 2002; Pins and ffytche, 2003; Zeki, 2003; Tse et al., 2005;
Lamme, 2006). However, when near-threshold stimuli are made
invisible under conditions of inattention, late differences involv-
ing fronto-parietal activation are often reported for seen vs. unseen
stimuli (Vogel et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2001; Rees et al., 2002b;Gross
et al., 2004; Marois et al., 2004; Pessoa and Ungerleider, 2004;
Haynes et al., 2005; Sergent et al., 2005), which is consistent with
models proposing that conscious perception emerges from the
recurrent activity of fronto-parietal regions, and its long-distance
reverberation with occipital areas (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Dehaene et al., 2006).
Recent functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) data from our
group (Chica et al., submitted) also support an important role
of functionally connected fronto-parietal networks in conscious
perception and in the interactions between spatial attention and
consciousness. fMRI signals were recorded while participants
responded to near-threshold stimuli preceded by peripheral cues.
Functional connectivity analyses during the orienting period (i.e.,
during the processing of the attentional cue, before the target was
presented) demonstrated that activity in a slightly right-lateralized
fronto-parietal network (including the bilateral superior and infe-
rior parietal lobes, the left frontal eye ﬁeld, the right insula, and
right inferior frontal gyrus) was tightly correlated to spatial atten-
tion and conscious reports. Strong coupling within this network
correlated with conscious reports when targets were presented at
the attended location; however, it correlated with “unseen” reports
when targets were presented at unattended locations. Coupling
within this network is associated to the efﬁciency of attentional
orienting, which is directly linked to the facilitatory effects of
spatial orienting on visual consciousness. Fronto-parietal inter-
actions can therefore be primed by attentional processes, thus
increasing the likelihood of conscious reports. Evidence of inter-
actions between spatial attention and consciousness was observed
in fronto-parietal regions, but not in lower level visual areas. This
result is consistent with previous reports of neural dissociations
between spatial attention and consciousness in the visual cortex
(Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008).
Based on the fact that some stimuli do not reach conscious-
ness even when they are attended (Cumming and Parker, 1997;
Zeki and Marini, 1998; Leopold and Logothetis, 1999; Enns and
Di Lollo, 2000; He and MacLeod, 2001; Intriligator and Cavanagh,
2001; Super et al., 2001), Lamme (2003) proposed that attention
might not determine whether stimuli reach consciousness, but
whether they can be reported. Attention would determine whether
the representation of stimuli is stable enough in working memory
to allow reportability. For example, in a change blindness para-
digm cueing the item that might change can prevent blindness.
But blindness is also prevented if the relevant item is cued long
after the ﬁrst stimulus (T1) has disappeared and before the onset
of the second stimulus (T2; Becker et al., 2000; Landman et al.,
2003). After T1 has disappeared, its representation is accessible,
and cuing can select information from working memory. How-
ever, when T2 is presented, the representation vanishes, and cuing
does not help anymore. This suggests that there is a short-lived,
vulnerable, and not easily reportable representation of visual expe-
rience, and a more stable and reportable representation form of
consciousness. In the case of change blindness, there is a general
consensus on the fact that focal spatial attention is needed in order
to perceive the change. In the absence of such attentional processes,
the contents of visualmemory are overwritten by subsequent stim-
uli and cannot be used tomake comparisons (Rensink et al., 1997).
Koivisto and Revonsuo (2010) have formulated a related proposal
based on ERP studies. Early differences on occipital ERPs (around
200–300ms after stimulus onset) are proposed to be linked to
short-lived, non-reportable representations of visual experiences,
while later differences in parieto-frontal sites (around 400ms after
stimulus onset) might be more related to conscious and reportable
representations. According to their proposal, spatial attention is a
necessary prerequisite for both kinds of representations, at least
when there is competition between stimuli (Koivisto et al., 2009).
These proposals are reminiscent of the distinction made by
Block (1996) between phenomenal and access consciousness, and
of a related, time-honored distinction between a form of immedi-
ate experience, not amenable to verbal description, and a reﬂective
form of consciousness that can be verbally reported (Merleau-
Ponty, 1942; Bartolomeo and Dalla Barba, 2002). According to
the above mentioned evidence, attention seems necessary to go
from phenomenal to access consciousness. Based on our recent
observations (Chica et al., 2010, 2011b, in press, submitted) we
propose that exogenously attended information is always phe-
nomenally represented, which is not the case for endogenously
attended information in the absence of exogenous attentional
capture. This can explain why endogenous spatial attention can
be electrophysiologically dissociated from consciousness (Wyart
and Tallon-Baudry, 2008; Chica et al., in press) while exogenous
spatial attention is not (Chica et al., 2010, in press, submitted).
However, in order to access consciousness and reportability, infor-
mation has to be endogenously attended in order to enter the
reverberating ﬂow of information within fronto-parietal regions
(van Gaal and Fahrenfort, 2008). This might be the reason why
making peripheral exogenous cues spatially predictive increases
the behavioral modulation produced on conscious perception as
compared to non-predictive cues, and modulates not only the
proportion of consciously reported stimuli and decision crite-
ria, but also the perceptual sensitivity to detect near-threshold
stimuli (Chica et al., 2011b). From a physiological point of view,
it is plausible that both feedforward processing (perhaps modu-
lated by exogenous attention), and recurrent processing (perhaps
enhanced by endogenous attention) in large-scale brain networks
are important mechanisms to allow a stable pattern of activity of
visual working memory that determines our reportable conscious
experience.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Spatial attention and conscious perception have been histori-
cally linked, though some recent studies have shown dissociations
between the two processes. In the present paper we reviewed evi-
dence indicating that although endogenous or top-down spatial
attention can sometimes be dissociated from conscious reports
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(mainly when there is no competing information), exogenous, or
bottom-up spatial attention seems to be an important antecedent
of our conscious experience. Nevertheless, exogenous attentional
capture per se is not a sufﬁcient condition for conscious access.
Other processes such as alerting, recurrent processing and patterns
of spontaneous brain activity before the stimulus occurs are pro-
posed as being necessary for a stimulus to be consciously perceived
and reported.
Even though during the last decades consciousness studies have
provided important insights about conscious and unconscious
processing in the human brain,many questions remain unresolved
(Lau, 2008). One of the most important issues to be solved exper-
imentally is the search for an objective measure of phenomenal
consciousness. Nowadays, consciousness is measured with ver-
bal reports or voluntary action. Although many believe that we
are conscious of much information we cannot report, there is a
current controversy about the existence of forms of conscious-
ness that would not be amenable to verbal report. It has been
argued that consciousness cannot be separated from the brain
mechanisms supporting it, such as attention, working memory,
or decision taking (Cohen and Dennett, 2011). In classical exam-
ples such as the Sperling’s partial report experiment (Sperling,
1960), participants are presented with a display of 9–12 letters.
Typically, only some of the items are available to verbal report.
However, when cued to report a subset of letters, participants can
entirely report whatever subset is cued, which might indicate that
at some point they were conscious of the whole subset. Although
this result is a crucial argument to claim that we are conscious
of more we can report, Cohen and Dennett offer an alternative
explanation (not far from Sperling’s original one): once the cue
is presented, participants are able to access an unconscious rep-
resentation before it decays. From this point of view, there would
be no form of experience not amenable to conscious report. This
proposition strongly links consciousness with high-level cogni-
tive functions such as attention, claiming that only attended items
will be consciously represented. Other proposals also posit that
the dissociation between phenomenal and access consciousness
is equivocal, suggesting that phenomenal consciousness might
be caused by perceptual illusions and non-conscious processing
(Kouider et al., 2010). These authors propose that perceptual
representations vary from complete unawareness of stimuli that
can eventually be processed and affect behavior while remaining
inaccessible to conscious reports, to complete awareness of infor-
mation that can be verbally reported. There exist other situations
of partial consciousness, which correspond to intermediate cases,
with conscious access only at same levels. In this latter case, access
can be ﬁlled in with perceptual illusions (Kouider et al., 2010).
According to this hypothesis, perceptual representations are grad-
ually represented, although conscious access can be an all-or-none
process, as proposed by other models (Baars, 1989; Sergent and
Dehaene, 2004).
These theoretical and empirical issues become especially rel-
evant in the study of consciousness in non-human animals and
in human beings who are incapable of communicating. Some
effort is being devoted in this sense, for example in the study of
vegetative and minimally conscious states. Simple cognitive tasks
are being used to determine the level of consciousness of non-
communicative patients. Neurophysiological measures extracted
from EEG (Bekinschtein et al., 2009) or fMRI (Cruse and Owen,
2010) are being used to determine the state of consciousness of
these patients and even to try to predict whether patients will
recover from coma (Faugeras et al., 2011). A better deﬁnition
and measurement of phenomenal and access consciousness will
certainly enable us to better explore the relationships between
different forms of spatial and non-spatial attention and conscious-
ness, as well as their underlying brain mechanisms in both the
healthy and damaged brain.
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